Here's article on China's complex role in the North Korean nuclear crisis written by my friend, John Park. I was psyched to learn that he got his op-ed piece published in the Asian Wall Street Journal. Since I have been writing about the esoteric and soft topic of friendship during the past few days, I might as well talk about John. He's one of the nicest and most solid individuals I have met, which I can't emphasize through words alone. We met briefly when he lived in Seoul for about a year while consulting for BCG, but we really didn't get a chance to further develop our friendship since he was leaving in a few months to start his post-doc program at Harvard. I truly regret it because I had admiration for what I knew of his character and enjoyed his good-natured personality. Also we had common interests in policy and politics, even though he's a little left of me, that helped tie our bond. He's definitely a person I wanted to get to know better, and hopefully I will as our lives move forward.
A Chinese Roadmap For Korea
THE ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL
by John S. Park
June 30, 2003
China is one of the few countries that has the political leverage to help resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, especially when it comes to the crucial issues of brokering a multilateral package deal and verifying the dismantling of Pyongyang's nuclear programs. That solution could best be achieved through a Chinese roadmap, consisting of a two-stage process.
In the first stage, Beijing would need to address Pyongyang's security concerns by sponsoring a nonaggression assurance from Washington, contingent upon the complete and verifiable rollback of North Korea's nuclear programs. In the second stage, the U.S., North and South Korea, China, Russia and Japan would need to agree to a comprehensive, multilateral aid package comprising economic incentives -- such as energy supplies, investment and development loans -- and diplomatic concessions -- such as normalization of ties between Pyongyang and regional powers in Northeast Asia. Both the first-stage nonaggression pact and the second-stage aid package would be part of a structured timetable -- coordinated by Beijing -- to coincide with an irreversible rollback of North Korea's nuclear programs.
Such a roadmap would not reward bad behavior by North Korea because the incremental, multilateral program would be coupled with stringent verification procedures, backed by a strong multilateral deterrence program. Chinese inspectors working in close collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency could carry out the critically important function of cataloguing and verifying the dismantlement of North Korea's plutonium-reprocessing and uranium-enrichment programs. Pyongyang would be less likely to object to this, given the alternative of inspection teams composed solely of IAEA or U.S. inspectors.
While the relationship between China and North Korea -- previously described as being as close as "lips and teeth" -- has deteriorated, China remains the only country that has the political ability to play such a sensitive role. That's not because of ideological kinship, but rather because Pyongyang fears China might withdraw the lifeline of oil and food that keeps the Kim Jong Il regime afloat
Although largely unreported, senior Chinese officials warned North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun during an early 2003 visit to Beijing that renewed nuclear brinkmanship could seriously strain Chinese-North Korean relations. To reinforce that point, Beijing temporarily shut off an oil pipeline to North Korea. China officially cited technical problems for the three-day shutdown in March of the oil pipeline which runs from its Daqing oilfields to North Korea. But according to a Western diplomat, the episode was an explicit warning to the Kim Jong Il regime that Beijing would not tolerate a further escalation of tensions in the region.
To North Korea analysts, China's recent warnings and stern actions demonstrate a discernible break with its past hands-off approach to dealing with Pyongyang's nuclear brinkmanship. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, the possible humanitarian disaster that might arise should the nuclear crisis spiral out of control. Beijing is concerned about a flood of North Korean refugees streaming into northern China, creating a humanitarian crisis that would not only be debilitating for China but also make it more difficult for Beijing to resist pressure to allow international aid organizations to run refugee camps on the mainland.
Secondly, China needs to guard against any diminution to its prestige should the nuclear crisis escalate into a military conflict. As the predominant military force and budding economic power in the Asia-Pacific region, a confrontation on the Korean peninsula would represent a major foreign-policy failure for Beijing. With an economy that has been flourishing since the mid-1990s, Beijing has garnered the respect of its economically prosperous neighbors. Commensurate with that economic progress has been a rise in its prestige. But a conflict in North Korea would lead its neighbors in Northeast Asia, along with the U.S., to question why China did not play a more proactive role in trying to prevent it.
Thirdly, Beijing wants to avoid any damage to its relations with the U.S. Since the previous crisis over Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions in 1994, the Chinese leadership has been anxious to ensure that differences over how to handle North Korea do not strain Sino-U.S. relations. In the present crisis, it has gone much further than before in trying to broker a solution. That was evident in April, when China hosted trilateral talks on the issue at the Diaoyutai state guesthouse in Beijing. Although the meeting between North Korean, American and Chinese representatives proved unproductive, it demonstrated Beijing's increasingly proactive role in trying to find a solution to the crisis.
Two obstacles remain that could constrain China from playing a larger role. The first is the traditional Chinese aversion to assuming political risk, coupled with its preference for exerting influence from behind the scenes. That means it remains unclear whether China has the political will to expose itself to the degree of international scrutiny that would come with formulating a road map to resolve the nuclear crisis. The second obstacle is how comfortable the Bush administration would feel in allowing Beijing to play what amounts to the lead role in resolving the nuclear crisis. But the more the crisis escalates, the more likely these obstacles are to fade away, as other policy options prove ineffective.
Until now, Beijing's approach to dealing with the nuclear crisis has been best summed up by Sha Zukang, China's former ambassador for arms control and disarmament. In a 2002 speech he said that "dialogue and consultation is the best way to reach consensus on the North Korean issue." Formulating a Chinese roadmap to try to resolve the crisis would be a significant evolution of that approach. The question remains whether Beijing is ready yet to take such a step.
Mr. Park is a postdoctoral research fellow at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. His research focuses on North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship.
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