CHINA'S XIAOKANG POLICY KEY TO NORTH KOREA
Post of My Left-Leaning Canadian Friend

Posted my friend's op-ed piece before, so here's another one that got printed in The Korea Herald. John is slightly left of center, but I believe he has good insights into the North Korea situation so I don't mind putting this up. Also my blog is about having shoutouts to friends... no matter how blindly they see the world... what up, John!


China's Xiaokang Policy Key To North Korea

The Korea Herald
by John S. Park
February 5, 2004

Recently, China has been playing a remarkably proactive role in trying to facilitate a resolution to the North Korean nuclear crisis and such behavior is in direct contrast to its discreet demeanor during the 1994 phase of the nuclear imbroglio.

What accounts for this major transformation in the conduct of Chinese foreign policy?

The answer, in large part, resides in China’s policy of xiaokang. Originally mentioned in the Shijing, China’s first collection of poems, Chinese philosophers used the term xiaokang to refer to a comfortable, orderly society that honors ceremony and propriety.

Deng Xiaoping went on to develop an economic xiaokang policy that became the basis of his famous “three-step development strategy” for building a substantial middle class society in China. In recent months, xiaokang has become the Chinese leadership’s dominant lens of analysis for dealing with North Korea.

Counter to the conventional thinking in Washington, China’s North Korea policy goes beyond security concerns to encompass larger considerations about xiaokang. A deeper examination of the relationship between xiaokang and China’s North Korea policy reveals the driving force of, and limitations to, the current six-party talks process. Why is xiaokang so important to China? Achieving a $3,000 GDP per capita target by 2020 is currently the Chinese leadership’s key economic development goal.

The significance of this figure is that the leadership believes that attaining it is critical to the formation of a stable and prosperous Chinese society. To realize this goal, however, Beijing needs to prevent any threats to the Northeast Asian security environment in order to maintain foreign investment inflows critical to job creation.

To ensure the regional stability required for internal economic development, the Chinese leadership initiated a major shift in its strategic thinking about North Korea that has manifested itself in a substantial change in China’s North Korea policy.

Recent interviews with influential Chinese government think tank analysts who focus on this critical policy area yielded the following core findings. First, Beijing is largely analyzing the nuclear issue from a cost-benefit analysis in terms of how the crisis is affecting xiaokang objectives should the six-party talks ultimately collapse, China Inc. may divest its North Korean partner, albeit peacefully. Second, Beijing is beginning to explore how it should deal with North Korea if the six-party talks collapse. Indeed, Chinese policy analysts are actively examining regime change policies required to effect major economic and systemic reforms in North Korea. Such policies differ from the Pentagon’s formulation of regime change as Beijing is exploring ways to structure a peaceful accommodation with Kim Jong-il rather than a disruptive regime collapse.

The focus is on examining ways to deal with Kim Jong-il and forge close working partnerships through Communist Party connections within the China-Korean Workers Party and between the People’s Liberation Army and the Korean People’s Army. The third key finding is a significant change that has recently occurred in China’s conduct of its North Korea policy.

China is increasingly proactive and multilateral in its behavior compared to its previously risk averse, insular tendencies. Indeed, traditionally a behind-the-scenes power broker, Beijing has taken a more visible role in encouraging Kim Jong-il to reengage in negotiations with the U.S.

The six-party talks are now scheduled to resume in Beijing on Feb. 25 and as the enormous difficulties with restarting these multilateral talks demonstrate, China can’t resolve the crisis by itself. In this respect, strong Sino-U.S. collaboration in leading a multilateral effort to end the crisis is long overdue.

Until recently, the Bush administration’s approach to dealing with North Korea has centered on largely ignoring the reclusive regime and gradually cutting off its overseas sources of illicit funds. However, as former Secretary of Defense William Perry has stated, an approach is not a policy.

China’s focus on achieving its xiaokang objectives presents the U.S. with a unique opportunity to engage Chinese leaders in forging an effective strategy for negotiating and implementing a comprehensive resolution to the nuclear imbroglio. Unofficial U.S. delegations are no substitute for the difficult negotiations required to peacefully unravel the crisis. Superficial U.S. diplomatic maneuverings are clearly not producing results and China has already begun to act substantively. So when will the U.S.?


The writer is a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. His research focuses on China’s efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis.